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Technical proposal SIMD-0609 Review

Prohibit Vote Account Self-Withdrawals

  1. Idea
  2. Draft
  3. Review
  4. Accept
  5. Implement
  6. Active

Decision brief

Why this proposal matters

Reject a Vote Program Withdraw instruction when the vote account and recipient resolve to the same address. After activation, every authorized self-withdrawal returns InvalidArgument. Other withdrawals are unchanged.

Source-backed reading aid · source language: EN

Proposal at a glance

What changes

  • Validate the vote account and authorized withdrawer using the existing rules.
  • Compare the addresses of the vote account and recipient.
  • If the addresses match, return InvalidArgument.

Stakeholder map

Who is affected

Builders & client teams Medium impact

Because the Vote Program is a native builtin, validator clients must implement the same feature-gated behavior before activation.

Action may be required
Validators & operators Medium impact

After activation, vote account self-withdrawals fail with InvalidArgument. Non-self withdrawals, instruction encoding, and account lists are unchanged.

Action requirement unknown
Users & stakers Impact unknown

No proposal-specific evidence was found for this group.

Action requirement unknown
Governance & ecosystem Impact unknown

No proposal-specific evidence was found for this group.

Action requirement unknown

Exact source revision

Full proposal document

Source-language document. Technical identifiers and evidence remain unchanged. 6cc17538e266

Summary

Reject a Vote Program Withdraw instruction when the vote account and recipient resolve to the same address. After activation, every authorized self-withdrawal returns InvalidArgument. Other withdrawals are unchanged.

Motivation

Currently, a Vote Program Withdraw instruction may use the same account as the vote account and recipient. A partial self-withdrawal that passes existing checks subtracts and then restores the requested lamports, making it a no-op.

A full self-withdrawal behaves differently. It deinitializes the vote account, subtracts its full balance, and restores the lamports to the same account. This leaves a funded, Vote Program owned, uninitialized account. Anyone else can then initialize that account with their own validator identity and authorities, taking control of the retained balance. Initiating the self-withdrawal requires the existing authorized withdrawer, making the behavior an operator footgun.

Self-withdrawals have no known use case. Rejecting them removes this risk. The Stake Program already rejects self-withdrawals with InvalidArgument.

New Terminology

N/A

Detailed Design

Vote Program Withdraw processes an instruction in this order:

  1. Validate the vote account and authorized withdrawer using the existing rules.
  2. Compare the addresses of the vote account and recipient.
  3. If the addresses match, return InvalidArgument.
  4. If the addresses differ, continue existing withdrawal processing.

The new comparison precedes withdrawal amount and account closure checks. It therefore applies to zero, partial, full-balance, and over-balance withdrawals.

The instruction data and account interface do not change.

Alternatives Considered

  • Reject only full self-withdrawals. This prevents vote account deinitialization but preserves partial and zero-lamport no-op transactions without a known use.
  • Skip deinitialization for full self-withdrawals. This makes them no-ops and leaves a special case that future changes must continue to handle safely.
  • Reject self-withdrawals only in the SDK and CLI. Custom transaction builders can bypass client-side checks, so this does not enforce the invariant.
  • Keep the existing behavior. This preserves the footgun.

Impact

After activation, vote account self-withdrawals fail with InvalidArgument. Non-self withdrawals, instruction encoding, and account lists are unchanged.

Because the Vote Program is a native builtin, validator clients must implement the same feature-gated behavior before activation.

Security Considerations

N/A

Evidence graph

Related proposals and rollout

One or more sources are unavailable.

Upstream review record

Upstream discussion & review

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simd.watch community discussion · SIMD-0609

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Provenance

Evidence & technical details

Rollout or chain data, source revisions, freshness and integrity.
3

SIMD

Deployment Status

Document lifecycleReview
CategoryCore protocol

Feature Gate not yet created

Exact source revision

Sources & integrity

  • Proposal document pinned_commit_blob
    6cc17538e26601e65beca89bbfa761e755720956
  • simd-document document · stale · Oct 29, 2026
    6cc17538e26601e65beca89bbfa761e755720956

One or more sources are unavailable.

One or more sources are unavailable.